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Wills, Trusts, and Administration
of Estates
by James C. Rehberg
One of the most difficult tasks in the writing of a survey article is that
of organization. Judicial decisions and legislative enactments just refuse
to appear in any logical sequence and, just as a case or statute has been
neatly assigned to a certain section of the paper, an issue pops up that
suggests that it would fit better in another section. Should the
discussion of that case or statute be moved into that other section or left
where it is?
Given this difficulty, an effort will be made to classify the materials
in a way that the major issues will be discussed in the sequence in
which they usually surface in the process of administration.
I.

A.

RECENT DECISIONS-WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

PreliminaryIssues

There are certain problems that, though not frequently encountered,
do demand early attention simply because they must be resolved before
normal administration can proceed.
1. Jurisdiction of Courts. In an action to determine heirship,' a
claim had been filed by a person who alleged that she was the virtually
adopted child and sole heir of a legatee who had predeceased the testator
and that she, therefore, was entitled to the legacy that deceased legatee
would have taken. After the trial court found in favor of the child, the
court of appeals faced a motion that it lacked jurisdiction and the case
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1. Goodman v. Hammonds, 224 Ga. App. 387, 480 S.E.2d 397 (1997).
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should be transferred to the supreme court as a case "involving wills.
The court denied the motion.' The parties did not raise, nor did the
court consider or resolve, any issue relating to the validity or the
meaning of the decedent's will. The sole issue was the child's virtual
adoption.4
2. Advancements. In Tankesley v. Thompson,5 after the death
intestate of the mother of four adult sons, one son, Richard, along with
the court-appointed administrator, asserted that the mother had
advanced about seventy thousand dollars to another son, Robert, during
the last two years of her life. Robert denied this assertion. Checks were
offered into evidence, all but one of which were made payable to a
business started by Robert. Most of those checks had a notation of
"investment" or "loan." Robert testified 1) that when his mother wrote
each check, she indicated that it was an investment and 2) that she
stated that she wanted her estate divided equally between the four
children without regard to gifts she had previously made. The other two
sons corroborated that this was her intention. The record also showed
that she had been a shrewd businesswoman who often invested in other
businesses.6 The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that while
a presumption of advancement had been shown, it had been clearly
rebutted by this other evidence.7
At this point it should be noted that Georgia's advancement statute8
will be considerably changed by the Revised Probate Code when it
becomes effective on January 1, 1998. 9 The new Code combines the
treatment of lifetime transfers in both intestate and testate estates. 10
It covers satisfaction of legacies as well as advancements by requiring
written evidence that a lifetime transfer was intended either as a
satisfaction of a legacy or as an advancement against the testamentary
gift or against the intestate share the recipient would eventually
receive. 1 The new Code requires either that the will specifically
contemplate the lifetime transfer as a satisfaction or advancement or
Id. at 388, 480 S.E.2d 398 (citing GA. CONST. OF 1983, art. VI, para. 3).
Id., 480 S.E.2d at 399.
Id. at 389, 480 S.E.2d at 399.
220 Ga. App. 641, 469 S.E.2d 853 (1996).
Id. at 641-42, 469 S.E.2d at 854.
Id. at 642, 469 S.E.2d at 854.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-50 to -54 (1995).
See O.C.G.A. §§ 53-1-10 to -13 (1997) (effective January 1, 1998). See generally
SARAJANE LOVE, REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN GEORGIA § 376
(Comparative Treatment ed. 1997).
10. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-10 cmt. (1997).
11. Id.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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that there be a separate written expression of that intent. 12 Additionally, the writing may be one that is signed by the transferor within thirty
days of the transfer, or it may be one that is signed by the recipient at
any other time.'
8. Slayer Statute. In Bradley v. Bradley,4 one of two sons, James,
sued the other, Benjamin, under Georgia's "slayer statute,"' 5 alleging
that Benjamin killed their father with malice aforethought and for that
reason was not entitled to share in the estate. In his will, the father left
most of his property to Benjamin. However, if Benjamin predeceased his
father and left no lineal descendants, that property went to other named
persons. The father left James only one hundred dollars, explaining that
he had previously conveyed real property to James. Later, the brothers
entered into a settlement agreement in which they divided the property
and James agreed to release Benjamin from the claims he had brought
related to their father's death.' 6
In 1995 the alternative beneficiaries in the will sued Benjamin and the
executor for a declaratory judgment as to whether Benjamin killed his
father with malice aforethought. Under the "slayer statute," if Benjamin
had done so, he would be presumed to have predeceased his father, and
the alternative beneficiaries would take under the will. Following this
claim, Benjamin moved to set aside the settlement agreement, asserting
under the agreement because of the
that he was unable to perform
17
declaratory judgment action.
In an action brought by James for enforcement of the agreement, the
trial court ruled in his favor, and the court of appeals afrmed.' The
court found that Benjamin had an inchoate interest in the property that
he was to take under the will, and this inchoate interest was legally
assignable; hence, the settlement agreement remained effective."
Although Benjamin's inchoate interest would not vest in him until the
executor assented, the interest would relate back to the death of the
father. Thus, the court determined that the declaratory judgment action

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.

Id.
225 Ga. App. 530, 484 S.E.2d 280 (1997).
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-6 (1995).
225 Ga. App. at 530, 484 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 531, 484 S.E.2d at 282.
Id. at 532-33, 484 S.E.2d at 283-84.

Id.
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brought by the alternative beneficiaries had no bearing on the validity
of the brothers' settlement. 0
4. Fiduciary Commissions. The court of appeals interpreted
statutes on fiduciary commissions on two occasions. In Sams v.
Leskanic,2 ' an attorney who had served as county guardian was named
administrator ex officio of the estate of an incapacitated adult ward.'
After completing administration, he filed a final return in which he
claimed statutory commissions on extra compensation of $7 11 .5 0 28 and
on a previous commission of $46.80. The probate court denied these
items, stating that it was "the practice of this court" to deny fiduciary
commissions on the disbursement of extra compensation or regular
commissions.'
The court of appeals only partially agreed. It agreed that the
administrator was entitled to the statutory commission of 2%% in and
2 % out for the payment of debts, legacies, or distributive shares,
including payment of a debt owed to him by the estate.26 However, this
statutory entitlement applies to only one payment of a debt. To allow
a commission on the disbursement of a commission would permit
payment of the same debt more than once and, logically, would lead to
the administrator's right to get another commission on the payment of
the first commission and so on ad infinitum. The court admitted that
the literal language of the statute 27 cduld lead to that construction but
refused to ascribe to the legislature such an unreasonable intention.'
The reconciliation of statutes on the subject of fiduciary commissions
was also required in In re Estate of Louise Donald.' After the death
of an incapacitated adult, the probate of the will, and the qualification
of the executor, the decedent's guardian-filed a final return in which he
proposed to pay himself the statutory commission on this final distribution as guardian. The probate court denied the claim, relying on Roberts
v. Chew,'" which relied on Official Code of Georgia Annotated

20. Id Approval of these family settlements among heirs, looked upon as a division
in kind, has long been the policy of the law. See SARA JANE LOVE, REDFEARN WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN GEORGIA § 375 (5th ed. 1988).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

220 Ga. App. 202, 469 S.E.2d 703 (1996).
See O.C.G.A. § 29-2-23 (1993).
220 Ga. App. at 202, 469 S.E.2d at 703 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-&150 (1995)).
d. at 202-03, 469 S.E.2d at 705.
Id. at 203, 469 S.E.2d at 705 (citing O.C.GA § 53.6-140 (1995)).
Id. (citing O.C.GA. § 53-6-144 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 204, 469 S.E.2d at 706.
222 Ga. App. 355, 474 S.E.2d 251 (1996).
198 Ga. App. 653, 402 S.E.2d 770 (1991).
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("O.C.G.A.") section 53-6-142, s1 dealing with commissions to successive
fiduciaries, and section 29-2-43,32 dealing with commissions to succesThe court of appeals reversed the denial of this
sive guardians."
34
claim.
The basic statute on fiduciary commissions contains the 2 % in and
2 % out rule, 5 which specifically applies to commissions received by
an "administrator, executor, trustee, or guardian.' ss However, as
applied to guardians, that section is limited by the more specific
language of the guardianship statute, which provides that when a
guardian resigns, dies, or is removed, no commission is allowed for
turning the estate over to a new guardian or for receiving of the same
by a new guardian. 7 The court of appeals held that this statute, being
specifically limited to the case when a guardian has died, resigned, or
been removed, was not applicable in Louise Donaldbecause the guardian
duty to turn the assets over
was seeking dismissal only because of his
38
to the executor named in the ward's will.
The court of appeals agreed that it could be rationally argued that the
turning over of assets by a guardian to an executor should stand on the
same footing as that of a guardian turning them over to another
guardian, in which case no commissions are payable.3 " The specific
language of the statute, however, does not so provide. The specific
language of O.C.G.A. section 53-6-142 provides that when assets pass
through the hands of "administrators and executors," the funds shall not
be diminished by commissions for each successive administrator or
executor.' The legislature's failure to include guardians in the section
is explained by the fact that the guardianship situation is specifically
covered by O.C.G.A. section 29-2-43. 4 i That section, which is limited
to the situation when the guardian resigns, dies, or is removed, did not
apply to Louise Donald because the guardian being granted dismissal
was entitled to receive the statutory commission.42

31. O.C.G.A. § 53-6-142 (1995).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id § 29-2-43 (1993).
222 Ga. App. at 335, 474 S.E.2d at 251-52.
Id. at 336, 474 S.E.2d at 252.
O.C.GA § 53-6-140.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
O.C.G-A. § 29-2-43.
222 Ga. App. at 356, 474 S.E.2d at 252.
Id.
Id.

Id. (citing O.C.G-.A § 29-2-43).
Id.
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B. Problem of NonprobateAssets
The estate of a decedent consists of all property interests owned by the
decedent at death that survived the death. The personal representative
is technically responsible only for "probate assets." All other assets
owned immediately prior to death, but which cease to exist at the
moment of death, are the "nonprobate assets." With reference to these,
the personal representative technically has no duties. It is hornbook law
that one of the first duties of the personal representative is to ascertain
and take control of all assets in the probate estate. That this task of
classification of assets is not an easy one is made obvious by the number
of cases that have reached the appellate courts of Georgia, as well as of
every other state, in which a court had to deal with this issue. Two
cases decided during this survey period are good illustrations.
The assets in dispute in Wilig v. Shelnut' were two joint accounts-a certificate of deposit and a checking account. Each bore the
names of the decedent and one of her granddaughters as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. The other granddaughter, as administratrix
of their grandmother's estate, sued the one named as joint tenant,
claiming that the accounts were estate assets. The evidence established
that in her subsequently executed will, the decedent made no mention
of these accounts but left the remainder of the estate to four named
relatives including plaintiff and defendant in this case."
The superior court relied primarily on affidavits of bank officials and
relatives of the decedent. None of these affidavits dealt with circumstances existing at the time of the opening of the disputed accounts; they
dealt with statements made or actions occurring at other times. Some
of this evidence tended to be favorable to one side of this case; some was
favorable to the other. The superior court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the granddaughter named as co-owner in the two accounts
was affirmed by the court of appeals.' The statute governing survivorship rights in joint accounts" requires clear and convincing evidence
of a different intention at the time the account was created in order to
rebut the statutory presumption in favor of survivorship rights. Even
assuming the admissibility of the affidavits, the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption." None of the affidavits provided
evidence that the decedent told the affiants at the time these joint

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

224 Ga. App. 530, 480 S.E.2d 924 (1997).
I&. at 530, 480 S.E.2d at 925.
Id.
O.C.GA. § 7-1-813(a) (1997).
224 Ga. App. at 532, 480 S.E.2d at 926.
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accounts were created that she did not want the accounts to belong to
the surviving cotenant. Because there was no evidence, the summary
judgment in favor of the surviving party to the accounts was justified."
The form of the account also prevailed in Jordan v. Stephens'
despite additional factual complications. In this case, the deceased
testator had executed a general power of attorney in favor of an official
in her bank, authorizing him to manage her affairs and to provide her
with ample funds for her support. Later, as payment for his help, she
transferred money to a joint and survivor account with him. After her
death a few months later, her executor and others sought these funds as
estate assets, claiming fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiffs also challenged the decedents transfer of one hundred shares
of bank stock originally held by her and one of the plaintiffs as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. The transfer was from decedent to
herself and the holder of the power of attorney as joint tenants with
right of survivorship. The jury verdict was in favor of the surviving joint
tenant with regard to both the joint survivor account and the one
hundred shares of bank stock.'
With regard to the joint and survivor account, the court of appeals
again relied on Georgia's multiple-party accounts statute 51 in holding
for the surviving party to the account.5 2 The statutory presumption in
favor of the surviving party was not rebutted by any evidence."
Instead, there was evidence that the decedent wanted the surviving
party to have these assets at her death and that she knew that a lot of
people were going to be surprised after she died." As for the one
hundred shares of bank stock that had been transferred, by the
decedents signature only, from herself and one of the plaintiffs to herself
and the surviving party, the court affirmed that it also belonged to the
Because there was evidence that the decedent
surviving party.'
wanted to remain the owner of this stock until her death, she remained
the only party with a present right to withdraw or change the account;
hence, the signature of her nominal cotenant was not necessary to
change the terms of the account."

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

I&
221 Ga. App. 8, 470 S.E.2d 733 (1996).
Id. at 8, 470 S.E.2d at 734.
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a).
221 Ga. App. at 8, 470 S.E.2d at 735.
Id. at 9, 470 S.E.2d at 735.
I.
Id. at 10, 470 S.E.2d at 735-36.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-812(a), -816 (1997)).
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Although this case was an 8 to 1 decision, the opinion of the lone
dissenter 7 deserved and received attention in the majority opinion
itself." The majority believed that the cases cited by the dissent were
factually distinguishable."9 While the majority did not elaborate on
this point, it does appear that the dissent overlooked the fact that the
multiple-party accounts section of the Uniform Probate Code is
designed as a part of Georgia's banking law, specifically a part of Title
7, captioned "Banking and Finance."6 Thus, it is Georgia's banking
law that strives to assure that the form of an account will show the
actual rights of ownership in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of a contrary intent. It may be that the dissent put the
emphasis on the general principles of guardianship and trust law when
it should have been on the later and more specific provisions of banking
law.
C.

Guardianand Ward
The fiduciary nature of the relationship of guardian and ward,
particularly as to nonprobate assets, was carefully examined in two
cases. In Moore v. Self,'2 a mother and her daughter jointly opened two
bank accounts and one stock investment account and jointly purchased
some real estate, all funded with the mother's money. The mother was
later declared an incompetent adult, and the daughter was appointed
guardian of her person and property. After the mother's death in 1994,
her other two children sued the daughter to have a constructive trust
declared of all property to which the daughter claimed title as surviving
joint tenant.' A summary judgment in favor of the daughter was, on
appeal, affirmed in part and reversed in part."
The court of appeals carefully addressed the property interests, legal
and equitable, in the assets held by the daughter as guardian at the
time of the death of the ward, her mother. First, the legal title to the
assets in the accounts and in the realty was not affected by the
subsequent incapacity of the mother.65 The declaration of the mother's

57. Id., 470 S.E.2d at 736 (McMurray, P.J., dissenting).
58. 221 Ga. App. at 9, 470 S.E.2d at 735.
59. Id.
60. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1.810 to -821.
61. l
62. 222 Ga. App. 71, 473 S.E.2d 507 (1996).
63. Id. at 71-72, 473 S.E.2d at 508.
64. Id. at 75, 473 S.E.2d at 510.
65. Id. at 72, 473 S.E.2d at 508. O.C.GA. section 7-1-813 leaves title to a joint account
in the surviving party to the account; O.C.GA. section 14-5-8 (1994) leaves title to jointly
held corporate shares or securities to the surviving joint tenant; and O.C.GA section 44-6-
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incapacity did not affect the legal title to the accounts, the stocks, or the
realty because a guardian, unlike a trustee, takes no legal title to the
ward's estate but holds it instead as a custodian whose possession is
deemed to be that of the ward." Second, the beneficial interests, as
distinguished from the legal title, in those assets were affected by the
creation of the guardianship. 7 When the daughter filed her petition
for appointment as guardian, she listed the disputed property as
belonging to the mother.' Guardians owe undivided loyalty to their
wards and must not place themselves in positions in which their
individual interests conflict with that of their wards.' The daughter
breached this duty upon acceptance of the guardianship because from
that time a potential conflict of interest existed.7 ° She stood to gain
personally by preserving these assets and the real property and
ultimately taking them as survivor. Because this loyalty rule is
preventative in nature, it is immaterial whether the guardian gained
from the transaction.71 By applying for and accepting appointment, she
knowingly placed herself in this conflict of interest situation, which
thereafter estopped her from asserting any claim to the property as
surviving joint tenant because such a claim would be adverse to the
estate of the ward.7" The court noted, though, that this estoppel
operated only in the guardianship context; it did not affect any interest
she might have in her mother's estate as heir, legatee, or devisee."
Bacon v. Smith 4 also concerned the rights of various persons to the
assets of a deceased ward. On the same day that the probate court
authorized settlement of a large tort claim in favor of their fifteen-yearold adopted son, the adoptive parents were appointed his guardians.
They then successfully petitioned the probate court for approval of
investment of much of the settlement funds in certain annuity plans.
With this court approval, the investments were made, naming the
adoptive parents as primary beneficiaries. The ward's half-brother (from
his mother's previous marriage) was not named as a beneficiary. The
designation of beneficiaries was done by the fifteen-year-old ward in the

190 (Supp. 1997) leaves title to jointly owned realty to the surviving tenant.
66. 222 Ga. App. at 72-73, 473 S.E.2d at 508-09.
67. Id. at 72, 473 S.E.2d at 508.
68. Id. at 73, 473 S.E.2d at 509.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 74, 473 S.E.2d at 509-10.
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id. at 74-75, 473 S.E.2d at 510.
74. 222 Ga. App. 542, 474 S.E.2d 728 (1996).
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presence of the probate judge and out of the presence of the guardians,
his adoptive parents.75
Near the end of the following year, the ward was killed in an accident,
and his guardians administered his estate and were granted letters of
dismission. Thereafter, the ward's half-brother filed for an accounting
and distribution of the estate, claiming that he was entitled, as an heir,
to a one-fifth share of the annuities and of the estate. The probate court
set aside the grant of letters of dismission, finding that the guardians'
final return did not show distribution of all the estate and that the halfbrother was entitled to a one-fifth share of all annuity payments. 76 The
superior court approved the setting aside of the letters of dismission of
the guardians but held that the half-brother had no interest in the
annuities, which were properly disposed of pursuant to the ward's
designation of beneficiaries. 77
In affirming the probate court's decision, the court of appeals pointedly
dealt with each of the disputed issues. First, the fifteen-year-old had the
capacity to make a will7" and, by analogy, the capacity to designate
beneficiaries of annuities, which operate as will substitutes.7 Second,
the guardians did not put themselves in a conflict of interest situation
when they were named as beneficiaries of the annuity contracts because
that was done with the guidance of the probate court and outside the
presence of the guardians.'
Third, while investments such as these annuities were not specifically
authorized guardians' investments when they were made, they were
specifically approved by the probate court on May 14, 1990; on July 1,
1990, this type of settlement arrangement was specifically codified.8 '
Furthermore, the statutory approval of trust fund investments by a
superior court also states that "any other investments of trust funds
shall be made under the order of the superior court or shall be at the
risk of the trustee.8 2 This authorization of approval of trust fund
investments by a superior court has also been applied by the Georgia
Supreme Court to the guardians' investments.8'

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 542-43, 474 S.E.2d at 730-31.
Id, 474 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 543, 474 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-2-22 (1995)).

Id.
Id., 474 S.E.2d at 730-31.
Id. at 543-44, 474 S.E.2d at 731 (citing O.C.G.A. § 29-2-16(b) (1997)).
Id. at 544, 474 S.E.2d at 731 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 53-12-280 (1995)).
Id. (citing Cochran v. Spinks, 180 Ga. 623, 180 S.E. 221 (1935)).
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Finally, the court agreed with the probate court's holding that the
half-brother was not entitled to a share of the annuities." They were
not assets of the decedent's estate but passed instead by virtue of the
annuity contract, operating as a will substitute." The half-brother was
entitled, though, along with his half-brother and with the ward's
parents, to share in whatever assets remained in the ward's estate."
D.

ProbateProblems

1. Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence. The issues of
testamentary capacity and undue influence often reach the appellate
courts after a lower court has directed a verdict, necessarily bringing up
the question of whether there was any conflict in the evidence as to any
material issue. Andrews v. Rentz 7 was this type of a case. The
evidence indicated that the testator in his first will executed in 1988 left
most of his estate to his granddaughter and two hundred dollars to his
daughter. The later will, executed in 1991, left nothing to the granddaughter, two hundred dollars to the daughter, and the residue of an
estate of about $250,000 to his caretaker, whom he also named as
executrix. He died in 1993 at the age of eighty-three. The daughter
appealed from the direction of a verdict for the caretaker."
A divided court (seven to two) affirmed."9 Undue influence must
amount to deception, force, or coercion that destroys the free agency of
the testator." A presumption that influence is undue arises when it
is shown that the will was made at the request of one who receives a
substantial benefit, who is not a natural object of the testator's bounty,
and who was in a confidential relationship with the testator at the time
of the will's execution. 9 However, one standing in a confidential
relationship to another is not prohibited from exercising any influence

84. /M
85. Id. The court analogized the investment of a ward's funds received in a tort
judgment to the investment of funds received in a workers' compensation settlement. The
latter funds have been held to be nonprobate assets. Id. (citing King v. Travelers Ins. Co.,

202 Ga. App. 568, 415 S.E.2d 176 (1992)).
86. Id. at 545, 474 S.E.2d at 731-32 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-4-2(5), (6) (1995)).
87.

266 Ga. 782, 470 S.E.2d 669 (1996).

88. Id. at 783, 470 S.E.2d at 670.
89. Mdat 784, 470 S.E.2d at 671.
90. I& at 783, 470 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Sims v. Sims, 265 Ga. 55, 452 S.E.2d 761
(1995)).
91. Id. at 783-84, 470 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, 348, 265

S.E.2d 282, 283 (1980)).

374

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

over him." Here, the majority found that there was no evidence that
the caretaker had any discussions with the testator as to the contents of
his will, that the caretaker participated in any way in the testamentary
planning, or that the testator felt in any way coerced at the time of
execution.9 The majority was also influenced by the fact that the
contested will left the caveatrix the same amount (two hundred dollars)
that the earlier will had left her.9
The dissenting justices felt that because of the inherently circumstantial nature of the evidence on undue influence, a finding of undue
influence over the elderly and dependent testator was not demanded.
Still, the court could have authorized such a verdict and, consequently,
should have precluded a grant of a directed verdict in favor of the
will.9 5
2. Mutual Wills. Smith v. TurnerO serves as an example of the
unanticipated and often unfortunate consequences of the use of mutual
wills. There, the husband and his wife of forty-five years each executed
a will in the presence of each other and two witnesses. Each spouse left
the entire estate to the other if he or she survived the testator; otherwise
the estate would go to any surviving child or children of the husband.
(The wife, a second wife of the husband, had no children of her own.)
The husband died in 1991 and was survived by several children. Three
months later, the wife executed a new will that left'nothing to these
children. The husband's will was admitted to probate, and the children
sued the wife for specific performance of an agreement to make mutual
wills pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 53-2-51. 7 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's finding that the wills were not mutual and that
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the estate of the wife was
correct."
The court discussed the 1967 amendment to the statute on mutual
wills, stating that the purpose of the amendment was to eliminate a
series of ad hoc decisions finding wills to be mutual by implication."
Because there was no express statement in the wills of the husband and

92. Id. at 784,470 S.E.2d at 671 (citing Ehlers v. Rheinberger, 204 Ga. 226,230-31,49
S.E.2d 535, 539 (1948)).
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id. at 785, 470 S.E.2d at 671-72.
96. 223 Ga. App. 371, 477 S.E.2d 663 (1996).
97. O.C.GA. § 53-2-51 (1995).
,98. 223 Ga. App. at 373, 477 S.E.2d at 664.
99. Id. at 372, 477 S.E.2d at 664 (citing 1967 Ga. Laws 719 and Coker v. Mosley, 259
Ga. 781, 387 S.E.2d 135 (1990)).
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wife that they were mutual, the remaining issue was whether there was
an express contract to make or to refrain from revoking a will. The
court defined "express contract" to include oral as well as written
The only remaining question was
utterances or declarations."°
whether there was any evidence of a contract in this case. There
certainly was no positive evidence. While the testimony of some of the
children seemed to imply an agreement, the evidence was not sufficiently
certain, definite, and clear to find an express contract.'
It is noteworthy that Georgia's new Revised Probate Code, effective
January 1, 1998, goes a long way toward clarification of these issues. It
provides: "A contract made after January 1, 1998, that obligates a
person to make a will or a testamentary disposition, not to revoke a will
be express and
or a testamentary disposition, or to die intestate shall
12
shall be in a writing that is signed by the obligor." 0
3. Mistake. The only issue on appeal in Shore v. Malloy'( s was
whether an alleged mistake of fact on the part of the testatrix that she
owned certain property, which her will purported to leave to her son,
had the effect of invalidating the will. Whether she in fact owned that
property was a contested issue in a five-day jury trial in probate court.
The court directed a verdict in favor of the will. °' 4 The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed.' 6
A mistake in the inducement for the making of a will is an error of
fact outside the will itself."° Courts generally do not invalidate a will
because of a mistake in the inducement, the accepted logic being that
almost every testator is mistaken about some of the collateral facts that
Litigation of every one of the
entered into the making of a will.'
facts would create an intolerable situation. °' s The Georgia statute,"°
however, did make one exception. It provided that a mistake of fact as
to the existence or the conduct of an heir would make the will inoperative as to that heir."o That statutory provision, though, did not apply
to the facts of this case. Even assuming that the disputed property did

100.

Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (6th ed. 1990)).

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 373, 477 S.E.2d at 665.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-30 (1997). See generally LOVE, supra note 9, § 15.
267 Ga. 44, 472 S.E.2d 303 (1996).
Id. at 44-45, 472 S.E.2d at 304.

105. Id. at 46, 472 S.E.2d at 305.

106. Id. at 45, 472 S.E.2d at 304.
107.

Id.

108. Id.
109.
110.

O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8 (1995).
267 Ga. at 45, 472 S.E.2d at 304.
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belong to the son at the death of the testatrix, that would not show
mistake as to the existence or the conduct of an heir."'
4. Conditional Wills. Brown v. Cronic... is a good example of the
problems raised by an allegation that a will was "conditional." The
testator and his fiancee planned to marry at Christmas of 1990, and in
August of that year, each executed a will leaving a substantial portion
of the estate to the other. The testator's will left real and personal
Then he named her son as executor,
property "to Wife to Be.""
identifying him as "my stepson." Two days before Christmas, the "Wife
to Be" died in an automobile collision; she and the testator never
married. Following her death, the testator instructed the son to "leave
everything just as it is." 4 Shortly thereafter, the testator died, and
the son offered the will for probate. The testator's daughter filed a
caveat and offered for probate a 1985 will of the testator, in which he
left everything to his two daughters. The stepson-to-be argued that the
1990 will was valid and that it revoked the 1985 will. The superior
court held that the 1990 will was invalid because it was conditioned
testator's marriage to his wife-to-be, and this condition did not
upon the
115
occur.
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed on this point, holding that the
1990 will remained valid because the language of the will showed only
that the testator executed that will in contemplation of marriage, not
that he made the contemplated marriage a condition of the validity of
the will."1 The court appeared impressed by the total absence from
the will of such words as "if," "on condition that," "in the event of," or
other words that might suggest that the will was conditional. 7
5. Revocation of Wills. The revocation issue was raised in two
different ways-in one case by acts committed on the will itself and in
the other by an inability to find a will that was known to have been
executed by the testator. In the first case, Havird v. Schlachter,1 the
instrument offered for probate had material cancellations and alterations
that would clearly raise a presumption of revocation 1 The testator's

111. Id,
112. 266 Ga. 779, 470 S.E.2d 682 (1996).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 779, 470 S.E.2d at 683. The will named the fiancee as his wife to be. Id.
Id. at 780, 470 S.E.2d at 683.
Id.
Id. at 781, 470 S.E.2d at 683-84.
Id.
266 Ga. 718, 470 S.E.2d 657 (1996).
Id. at 718, 470 S.E.2d at 658 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-2-74 (1995)).

1997]

WILLS AND TRUSTS

377

sole heir claimed that the will was revoked and that, therefore, he
should take the entire estate by intestacy. The only claim of the
propounder was that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation was
sufficient in this case to rebut the presumption of revocation. A
summary judgment in favor of the heir's claim was affirmed by the
Georgia Supreme Court.120 It noted that this doctrine is one of
presumed intent that the testator planned to make a new will." 1 If
that intent was not effectuated, the will, though actually canceled and
Here, the proobliterated, would still be admissible to probate.'
pounder offered no evidence that the testator intended to make a new
will; hence, that prerequisite for the application of the doctrine was not
shown. 20 There was no evidence that the testator intended to attach
any condition to his act of cancellation and alteration."
A troublesome issue of revocation was presented in Horton v.
Burch. 20 The testator executed the will in triplicate, each of the three
copies (original and two duplicates) being executed with the same
formality and containing the original signatures of the testator and the
witnesses. The testator retained the original and one duplicate, leaving
the remaining duplicate with her attorney. Following her death in 1994,
her duplicate was found in her safety deposit box, but the original and
a codicil were not found. When the duplicate was offered for probate,
her son caveated on the ground that the offered will was not the
original. Probate was denied, and on appeal the superior court denied
the son's motion for summary judgment. 12' The court relied on the
statute that authorizes express revocation by destruction or obliteration"2 and on King v. Bennett"2 for the proposition that there must
first be evidence of the "condition of the [original] will" before the
that the testator destroyed the original will with the
presumption arises129
intent to revoke it.

120. Id.
121. Id at 719, 470 S.E.2d at 658.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 720, 470 S.E.2d at 659.
124. Id. (relying strongly on two of the leading cases on this doctrine-Carter v. First
United Methodist Church, 246 Ga. 352, 271 S.E.2d 493 (1980), and McIntyre v. McIntyre,
120 Ga. 67, 47 S.E. 501 (1904)).
125. 267 Ga. 1, 471 S.E.2d 879 (1996).
126. Id. at 1, 471 S.E.2d at 879.
127. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-74.
128. 215 Ga. 345, 110 S.E.2d 772 (1959).
129. 267 Ga. at 2-4,471 S.E.2d at 880-81 (quoting King, 215 Ga. at 348, 110 S.E.2d at
775).
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The Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding
that the lower court erred in relying on the statute governing express
revocation by destruction and obliteration. 1 The applicable statute
governing lost wills provides that when a will has been lost during the
testator's lifetime, or lost or destroyed after his death, a copy of the will
may be admitted upon proper proof."' When, however, a will is
uncontrovertedly lost, as in this case, it followed that the trial court
erred in holding that there must first be evidence of the condition of the
will before the presumption of revocation can arise. 32 Because the
case came up on a summary judgment ruling, the supreme court did not
address the merits of the parties' arguments of whether a material issue
of fact remained that might rebut the presumption of revocation. That
will be a matter for the trial court to consider on remand."
E. ConstructionProblems
The construction problems reaching the Georgia Supreme Court
during the survey period involved two real (or alleged) inter vivos trusts
and two very real testamentary trusts.
1. Constructive Trust. This type of trust, the very existence of
which is implied long after the occurrence of the facts allegedly giving
rise to the implication, is designed to remedy the situation in which legal
title to property, through fraud or other wrongdoing, has come to be
vested in a person not rightfully entitled to it.'
Delay in the assertion of a constructive trust may bar one's right to
assert it and thus render immaterial the abstract merits or demerits of
the original claim. This was the fate of the claim in Troup u. Loden.1 N
That claim arose, if at all, in 1974 when a mother conveyed land to one
of her sons and two other sons signed the deed as witnesses. In 1983
the mother died, and in 1985 and 1988, the witnessing sons died, neither
apparently having asserted any claim to the land. In 1994, twenty years
after the execution of this deed, heirs of the witnessing sons sued to
establish a constructive trust in the land. They claimed that when the
deed was executed, the grantee-son promised to divide the land with the
other two brothers after their mother's death. The supreme court

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 2-3, 471 S.E.2d at 880-81 (citing O.C.GA. § 53-2-74).
Id., 471 S.E.2d at 880 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-3-6 (1995)).
Id. at 4, 471 S.E.2d at 881.
Id.
See O.C.G.A. § 53-12-93 (1995).
266 Ga. 650, 469 S.E.2d 664 (1996).
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affirmed
the trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the grantee130
son.
Equity may bar a claim when the lapse of time and the claimant's
neglect in asserting his rights have caused prejudice to the other party.
In determining whether the doctrine of laches should apply, a court
should consider things such as the length of the delay, the sufficiency of
the excuse for it, the loss of material evidence, and the opportunity of
the claimant to have acted sooner.137 The burden is on the defendant
to prove that he was prejudiced by the delay. The record in this case
showed that neither the brothers who witnessed the deed in 1974 nor
their heirs ever challenged the defendant's title; nor did they assert any
This delay
claim when the defendant sold timber off the land."
prejudiced the defendant because it forced him to dispute claims based
on conversations with persons now dead."
The supreme court noted that because laches is a factual defense, the
better practice would have been for the judge, as chancellor, to hold an
evidentiary hearing rather than to act on a motion for summary
judgment. 4" Still, depositions in the record showed clearly that the
claimants' long delay in asserting the claim had rendered ascertainment
of the truth difficult.'4 1
2. Abatement of Legacy. The disposition of a $500,000 bequest
was controlled by the application of some general maxims of construction
to some very precise language in the will in Timberlake v. Munford.'
As is often the case, the problem was complicated by the terms of a
property settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce
decree of the testator and the legatee. The agreement provided that the
husband's estate would pay $500,000 within ninety days after his death
in full discharge of his obligation to his former wife. He remarried in
1980 and she in 1990, at which latter time the alimony payments ceased.
In 1992 he executed a new will in which one clause stated that his
former wife was to receive $500,000 in full satisfaction of his obligations
under the 1977 settlement agreement. 1'

136. Id. at 650, 469 S.E.2d at 665.
137. Id. at 651,469 S.E.2d at 665 (citing Johnson v. Sears, 199 Ga. 432,435,34 S.E.2d
541, 543 (1945)).
138. Id., 469 S.E.2d at 666.

139. Id.
140.
141.
142.
143.

I
Id.
267 Ga. 631, 481 S.E.2d 217 (1997).
Id. at 632, 481 S.E.2d at 218.
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After his death in 1993, she sued the estate for payment of the
$500,000 legacy. The superior court ruled that the plain meaning of the
settlement agreement was that she would be entitled to the legacy only
if she were receiving alimony at the time of his death.1 " Because that
was not the situation, the legacy abated. The supreme court, however,
reversed, reinstating the legacy and stressing the language of the
subsequently executed will rather than that of the property settlement." That will expressly stated: "I give Five Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($500,000) to my former wife .. .," suggesting an intention
to make this bequest even though his obligation to pay alimony had
ceased prior to his death. 47
3. Encroachment in Favor of Life Beneficiary. Kicklighter v.
Woodward'" contained an interesting issue of encroachment on behalf
of a life beneficiary. The estate, consisting mostly of realty, was devised
in trust to the widow, a son, and the bank. It turned out that the son
predeceased his father, and the bank withdrew as a trustee, leaving the
widow as sole trustee. Under the terms of the will, the trustees were to
manage the trust and to pay the net income to the widow for life and the
remainder to the grandson of the testator. The trustees had the power
to invade the corpus if in their discretion the net income proved
insufficient
to maintain the widow in her accustomed standard of
149
living.
After probate of the will, it was determined that the estate owed more
than $103,000 in federal and state estate taxes. Because all liquid
assets were in joint tenancy with, and were received by, the widow upon
the testator's death, the widow paid the estate taxes from her personal
funds in 1980. She also paid $7,500 in commissions to the co-executor.
The 604 acres of timberland owned by the testator at death went into
the testamentary trust." °
In 1993 with the consent of the co-executor, the widow sold timber
from the tract for $306,000. In 1994 she petitioned the probate court for
a final accounting, for repayment to her of the amounts of the debts of
the estate that she had personally paid, and for a final distribution of

144. Id. at 631, 481 S.E.2d at 217.
145. Id. at 633, 481 S.E.2d at 219.
146. Id. at 632, 481 S.E.2d at 218.
147. It is interesting that both the trial court, in construing the agreement, and the
reversing court, in construing the will, purported to apply the "plain meaning" rule. See
id. at 631, 481 S.E.2d at 218.
148. 267 Ga. 157, 476 S.E.2d 248 (1996).
149. Id. at 157, 476 S.E.2d at 249.
150. Id.
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the assets. She also claimed that she, as income beneficiary, was
entitled to all of the net proceeds from the sale of the timber. The
probate court ruled in her favor, but the superior court held that her
claim for reimbursement of her payment of estate obligations from her
personal funds was time-barred and that the will itself classified the
proceeds from the timber-cutting as corpus rather than as income.""
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the widow's only right of
encroachment would have been if trust income proved inadequate to
maintain her in her accustomed standard of living.' Only then would
an encroachment on the remainderman's interest have been justified. "
4. Modification of Trusts. While administrative deviation from
the precise terms of a private trust has been allowed by statute in
Georgia at least since 1991,- 54 the courts are zealous in the protection
of the substantive property rights created by a settlor. Barnes v.
Nationsbank5 5 is a recent example. In Barnes the will created a trust
for the benefit of the testator's son, identifying him as the "primary
beneficiary." " It provided that the son be supported in the style to
which he was accustomed and that his dependents be similarly
supported to the extent that the trustee could reasonably do so. Another
provision provided for distribution of the corpus to the son's two children
after his death.'57
Later, after the son filed a bankruptcy petition, the trustee proposed
to disburse to him $6,368 a month from the trust to enable him to
continue in his accustomed standard of living. The son's two children,
both now emancipated, objected, and a declaratory judgment action was
filed in which the trustee sought permission either to make this
proposed distribution or to divide the trust between the son and the
children pursuant to terms of the 1991 modification statute."M
The trial court's grant of the requested division of the trust was
reversed by the supreme court. 9 It held that because the son, the
primary beneficiary, was still alive, the children had only remainder

151. Id. at 158,476 S.E.2d at 250 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (1982) (barring enforcement
of an obligation on an open account more than four years after the cause of action accrues)).
152. Id. at 160, 476 S.E.2d at 251.
153. Id.
154. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-152 (1995).
155. 267 Ga. 234, 476 S.E.2d 563 (1996).
156. Id. at 234, 476 S.E.2d at 563.
157. Id. at 235, 476 S.E.2d at 564.
158. Id. at 234, 476 S.E.2d at 563-64 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-152(b) (1997)).
159. Id. at 236, 476 S.E.2d at 565.
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interests.l"o Being emancipated children, they were no longer dependants. The modification statute allows a division of a trust only if it "is
not inconsistent with the intent" of the creator of the trust. 1 Here,
a division would have been inconsistent with that intention. The status
of the son as primary beneficiary, coupled with the trustee's duty to hold
the entire trust estate for the primary purpose of his support, left the
entire trust estate subject to the trustee's power to encroach and left the
remainder interest subject to defeasance to the extent that encroachment
might be necessary.'

II. LEGISLATION
The first phase in a comprehensive revision of Georgia fiduciary law
ended in 1991 with the adoption of the Georgia Trust Act.'" Then,
following several years of study and drafting, the Probate Code Revision
Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia
presented a Revised Probate Code,'" a comprehensive revision of
chapters 1 through 11 of Title 53 of the Official Code of Georgia. This
probate code was adopted with an effective date of January 1, 1998.16
The 1997 session of the Georgia General Assembly made a few changes
and approved
the amended code, leaving the effective date un6
changed.
III. CONCLUSION
Guardianship law remains in the process of revision. The 1996 session
of the General Assembly approved a resolution creating the Joint
Guardianship Rewrite Committee.'67 That committee, finding it
impossible to complete its task by its expiration date, was re-created and
will file its report on or before December 1, 1997, on which date the recreated committee shall stand abolishedM

160. Id at 235-36, 476 S.E.2d at 564.
161. O.C.GA. § 53-12-152(bX1) (1997).
162. 267 Ga. at 235, 476 S.E.2d at 564.
163. 1991 Ga. Laws 810 (codified as amended at O.C.GA. §§ 53-12-1 to -394 (1997)).
164. Whether or not that is the official title, it is the one used by the publisher of the
definitive work in Georgia on the subject. See, e.g., LOVE, supra note 9.
165. 1996 Ga. Laws 504 (codified as amended at O.C.G. §§ 53-1-1 to 53-11-6 (1997)).
166. 1997 Ga. Laws 1352 (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 53-1-1 to 53-11-6 (1997)).
167. 1996 Ga. Laws 901 (approving Ga. S. Res. 399).
168. 1997 Ga. Laws 1217 (approving Ga. S. Res. 73).

